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Over the last years, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have become increasingly exposed to a wide range of
cyber-physical threats. Efficient models and techniques able to capture their complex structure and identify
critical cyber-physical components are therefore essential. AND/OR graphs have proven very useful in this
context as they are able to semantically grasp intricate logical interdependencies among ICS components.
However, identifying critical nodes in AND/OR graphs is an NP-complete problem. In addition, ICS settings
normally involve various cyber and physical security measures that simultaneously protect multiple ICS
components in overlapping manners, which makes this problem even harder. In this paper, we present an
extended security metric based on AND/OR hypergraphs which efficiently identifies the set of critical ICS
components and security measures that should be compromised, with minimum cost (effort) for an attacker,
in order to disrupt the operation of vital ICS assets. Our approach relies on MAX-SAT techniques, which we
have incorporated in META4ICS, a Java-based security metric analyser for ICS. We also provide a thorough
performance evaluation that shows the feasibility of our method. Finally, we illustrate our methodology
through a case study in which we analyse the security posture of a realistic Water Transport Network (WTN).
Security metrics, cyber-physical security, AND-OR graphs, hypergraphs, MAX-SAT resolution, ICS, CPS.
1. INTRODUCTION
For many decades, Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
such as water treatment plants, energy, oil, gas
plants, and others, have been safely operated in iso-
lation from the external world. However, with the ad-
vent of the Internet, new convenient IT-based control
mechanisms, and highly interconnected networks,
ICS environments have become an appealing target
for malicious actors. Cyber attacks on these systems
can have devastating consequences such as flood-
ing, blackouts, or even nuclear disasters (Humayed
et al. (2017)). Stuxnet, Industroyer, NotPetya, and
more recently, WannaCry, exemplify the impact this
type of attack may have on critical ICS infrastructures
(CyberXReport (2019); Lee et al. (2016); Falliere et
al. (2011)). Therefore, protecting industrial control
systems from cyber threats is a high priority as
their compromise can result in a myriad of different
problems, from service disruptions and economical
loss, to jeopardising natural ecosystems and putting
human lives at risk.
Due to the complex nature of cyber-physical systems
and the convoluted web of dependencies among
their components, it is paramount to count with
appropriate models and tools able to measure
ICS security and prioritise their weakest points. In
particular, identifying critical ICS nodes not only
allows to understand the security level of a system
but also provides actionable information that can be
used to decide how and where to improve security as
well as adding redundant and fallback components to
increase reliability. While previous works do propose
different techniques to quantify ICS security levels,
they usually consider an individual security score for
each ICS component that are then combined based
on the underlying logical connectivity, e.g. AND/OR
dependency graphs (Barre`re et al. (2019)). However,
when various cyber-physical security measures
(often disregarded in physical environments) are
applied simultaneously to protect one or more ICS
components altogether (e.g. fenced areas, alarm
systems, authentication procedures), the use of
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independent scores on each ICS component might
fail to capture the overall security level of the system.
In this paper, we present a novel approach based
on AND/OR hypergraphs that is able to efficiently
identify the set of critical components and security
measures, with the lowest compromise cost (effort)
for an attacker, whose violation would imply an
operational disruption to the ICS system. Our
approach builds upon the model presented in
(Barre`re et al. (2019)) and extends the strategy to
address multiple overlapping security measures.
Our main contributions are: (1) a mathematical
model able to represent multiple overlapping secu-
rity measures over complex AND/OR dependency
graphs for ICS environments, (2) an efficient security
metric to identify critical cyber-physical components
and security measures, (3) an implementation pro-
totype based on META4ICS (META4ICS (2019)),
(4) an extensive experimental evaluation on perfor-
mance and scalability aspects, and (5) a case study
conducted on a realistic water transport network that
shows the applicability of our security metric.
2. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS
In this section, we recall the main concepts of the
base security metric (Barre`re et al. (2019)).
2.1. Network graph modelling
An industrial network W is modelled as an AND/OR
graph G = (V,E) that represents the operational
dependencies in W . The graph involves three types
of basic vertices, called atomic nodes (VAT ), that
model different network components: S represents
the set of sensor nodes, C represents the set of
actuator nodes, and A represents the set of software
agents (running for example in PLCs and RTUs).
We define VAT = S ∪ C ∪ A. In addition, the graph
also involves two artificial node types that model
logical dependencies between network components:
∆ represents the set of logical AND nodes, and Θ
represents the set of logical OR nodes. The set of all
graph nodes is defined as V (G) = VAT ∪∆ ∪Θ.
E(G) corresponds to the set of edges among nodes
and their semantics depend on the type of nodes
they connect. Roughly stated, an edge (a1, a2)
means that node a2 depends on a1 to work properly.
The graph also involves AND and OR nodes, which
act as special connectors and are interpreted from a
logical perspective. If a node v is reached by an OR
node, this means that the operational purpose of v
can be satisfied, i.e. v operates normally, if at least
one of the incoming nodes to the OR node is also
satisfied. Alike, a node w reached by an AND node
will be satisfied if all of the incoming nodes to the
AND node are also satisfied.
2.2. Simple example
Let us consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Case 1 - Individual protection measures
In this case, the AND/OR graph reads as follows:
the actuator c1 depends on the output of software
agent d. Agent d, in turn, has two alternatives to work
properly; it can use either the readings of sensor a
and the output from agent b together, or the output
from agent b and the readings of sensor c together.
Focused on actuator c1, the metric models these
dependencies from a logical perspective as follows:
fG(c1) = c1 ∧ d ∧ ((a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c))
More formally, fG(t) produces a propositional
formula that represents the logical semantics of
G with regards to t, i.e. the logical conditions
(dependencies) that must be satisfied to fulfil node t.
In addition, each CPS component has associated an
individual score that represents its compromise cost
where inf means infinite.
The objective of the attacker is to falsify fG(c1),
thus satisfy the formula ¬fG(c1), in order to make
c1 unable to operate. The metric considers the
compromise costs of the nodes as the weights of
the logical variables, in the form of a cost function
ϕ(n) : VAT → R≥0, and then builds a Weighted
Partial MAX-SAT problem. A solution to this problem
indicates the nodes that should be compromised in
order to disrupt the operation of actuator c1, with
minimal effort (cost) for the attacker.
In our example, the least-effort attack strategy to
disable actuator c1 is {a, c} with a total cost of 6. The
compromise of sensors a and c will disable both AND
nodes, and consecutively the OR node, which in turn
will affect node d and finally node c1. We formalise
the original security metric in the next section.
2.3. Base security metric definition
Let W be an industrial network, G = (V,E) a
directed AND/OR graph representing the operational
dependencies in W , and t a target network node.
The objective of the security metric, denoted as
2
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µ(G, t), is to identify the set of nodes X =
{x1, . . . , xh} that must be compromised in order to
disrupt the normal operation of target node t, with
minimal cost for the attacker. More formally, µ : G ×
V → 2V is defined as follows:
µ(G, t) = argmin
X⊆VAT
( ∑
xi∈X
ϕ(xi)
)
s.t.
wcc(σ(G,X)) ≥ 2 ∨X = {t}
(1)
where the solution with minimal cost must be either
node t or a set of nodes X such that, if removed
(with function σ), t gets disconnected from the
graph. Function σ(G,X) removes from G each
node x ∈ X and the nodes that depend on them
following a logic-style propagation, as explained
in Barre`re et al. (2019). The result is then analysed
with function wcc(G), which computes the number
of weakly connected components in G, that is,
the number of connected components when the
orientation of edges in G is ignored. In other words,
the restriction on wcc(G) ensures that the target
node t is disconnected from a non-empty set of
nodes on which t depends (directly or indirectly) to
function properly.
3. USING MULTIPLE OVERLAPPING SECURITY
MEASURES
While quite useful, the original metric is only able
to capture cyber-physical security measures that are
applied independently to each ICS component. That
is, it can capture that sensors a and c are protected,
for example, by fenced areas (each one with cost 3),
but it cannot model that both sensors are protected
by one single fenced area with cost 3. In other
words, the metric assumes that these two fenced
areas are different, and thus compromising one of
them does not affect the other. In mathematical
terms, this means that the costs for the attacker are
completely independent. Nevertheless, if the fenced
area is the same for both sensors, then the attacker’s
effort (cost) required to compromise the security
mechanism must be considered only once. Let us
consider a second example, illustrated in Figure 2.
This second scenario describes a more general
problem where many security measures, as those
exemplified in Table 1, can be jointly applied to
protect multiple ICS components simultaneously.
Measure Cost (attacker) Description
M1 2 Sound alarm
M2 3 Fenced area
M3 7 Locked container
M4 12 Tamper-resistant container
M5 inf Alarmed locked building
Table 1: Protection measures
Figure 2: Case 2 - Multiple overlapping measures
In particular, each ICS component is protected by
one or more security measure instances sj of type
Mi, as described in Table 2. We define S =
{s1, s2, . . .} as the set of involved security measure
instances. We call protection range to the set of ICS
components protected by a single instance sj .
Measure instance s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Measure type M2 M3 M1 M4 M5
Attacker’s cost ψ(sj) 3 7 2 12 inf
Protection range {a, c} {b} {a} {d} {c1}
Table 2: Security measures for Case 2
Each measureMi involves a cost for the attacker that
quantifies the effort that he or she has to make in
order to bypass the measure. We model this aspect
for measure instances as a function ψ : S → R≥0.
In the second scenario, sensors a and c are
protected by the same security measure instance
s1 (fenced area). Therefore, the cost of bypassing
s1 to compromise sensor a, sensor c, or both, is 3.
However, sensor a is also protected by the security
measure s3 (sound alarm). As a consequence,
compromising sensor a would imply to bypass both
protective measures s1 and s3. Therefore, the best
strategy in this case is to compromise the security
measures s1 and s3, involving the critical nodes a
and c, with a total cost of 3 + 2 = 5. Note that the
original metric would have counted 3 + 2 for sensor a
and 3 for sensor c, totalling a cost of 8.
In the next section, we formalise an hypergraph-
based extension to the base metric described in
Section 2 that allows to capture multiple security
measures applied to various ICS components in
overlapping manners.
4. EXTENDED SECURITY METRIC
4.1. Mathematical reformulation
We redefine the security metric µ(G, t) as follows:
µ(G, t) = argmin
X⊆VAT
( ∑
xi∈X
ϕ(xi) +
∑
sj∈S(X)
ψ(sj)
)
s.t.
wcc(σ(G,X)) ≥ 2 ∨X = {t}
(2)
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where function S(X) returns the set of security
measure instances used to protect the nodes in X.
Since S(X) returns a set, measure instances that
protect more than one node in X appear only once,
and thus their costs are considered only once in
Equation 2. Note also that ϕ(n) can be neutral (e.g.
ϕ(n) = 0,∀n ∈ VAT ) to only consider the costs of
the security measures, or it can be instantiated with
cyber costs, e.g. CVSS scores (CVSS (2019)).
4.2. AND/OR hypergraph formalisation
Hypergraphs are a generalisation of standard
graphs where graph edges, called hyperedges, can
connect any number of vertices (Berge (1989)).
More formally, let X be a set of vertices X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn}. A hypergraph on X, denoted H =
(X,E), is a family of subsets of X, with E =
{e1, e2, . . . , em}, such that: (1) there are no empty
edges in H, i.e. ei 6= ∅,∀ei ∈ E; and (2) X is covered
by E, i.e.
⋃m
i=1 ei = X.
In this work, we propose the use of a hybrid type
of hypergraph, called AND/OR hypergraph, which
essentially combines properties of hypergraphs and
the logical structure of AND/OR graphs. Roughly
stated, the nodes of an AND/OR hypergraph are
the hyperedges of a standard hypergraph, and these
are linked using logical AND/OR nodes as done in
classical AND/OR graphs.
We use standard hypergraphs to model groups of
security measures that are applied to each ICS
component in the network. For example, let us
consider Case 2 illustrated in Figure 2. In this case,
the hypergraph is defined as H = (X,E) where X =
VAT ∪ S is the set of nodes of the hypergraph, and
E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5} is the set of hyperedges. Table
3 details the members of each hyperedge ei ∈ E.
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
{a, s1, s3} {c, s1} {b, s2} {d, s4} {c1, s5}
Table 3: Hypergraph H for case 3
Hyperedges combine each network node with the
instances of the security measures that are used to
protect them. The advantage of using hypergraphs
is that we can capture multiple overlapping security
measures in the hyperedges of the hypergraph. In
addition, we can easily model protection ranges,
that is, how a specific measure instance, e.g.
a fenced area, protects multiple ICS components
simultaneously, e.g. s1 7→ {a, c}.
At a semantic level, the interpretation of a hyperedge
ei is that the original node n is accompanied by
the security measures that protect it, and therefore,
node n can only be disrupted if every security
measure in ei is compromised too. Now hyperedges
can be understood as super nodes that represent
Figure 3: AND/OR hypergraph for Case 2
each original node and their protective measures.
Therefore, we can follow the same logical structure
as in the original graph and combine these super
nodes via AND/OR connectives as illustrated in
Figure 3. From a logical perspective, we map the
dependency model of the AND/OR hypergraph as
follows:
fH(e5) = e5 ∧ e4 ∧ ((e1 ∧ e3) ∨ (e3 ∧ e2))
As explained in (Barre`re et al. (2019)), the objective
of the attacker is to falsify the previous formula
(or satisfy ¬fH(e5)) in order to make the target e5
non-functional. Since each hyperedge ei involves
many security measures plus the original node n,
the only way to falsify ei is to falsify every member
in it. Therefore, we logically capture this aspect
by replacing each hyperedge ei by a disjunctive
construct (n ∨ si ∨ . . . ∨ sj), where si ∨ . . . ∨ sj is the
disjunction of measure instances that protect node
n. Such a disjunctive construct actually forces a SAT
solver to make every security measure false, which
essentially equals to the fact that the attacker must
compromise all of the measures to take control of
the ICS component.
Considering the costs of the security measures as
weights for the logical variables, we extend the
MAX-SAT problem specification as explained in the
following section.
4.3. Weighted Partial MAX-SAT problem
specification
The following steps describe the actions required to
prepare the specification of the MAX-SAT problem.
1. Traverse the dependency graph G and build
an equivalent logical representation, fG(t), as
explained in Section 2.
2. Build a new formula hG(t) by replacing each
atomic node n ∈ VAT in fG(t) with (n ∨ si ∨
. . .∨ sj), where si ∨ . . .∨ sj is the disjunction of
security controls that protect node n.
3. Transform the attacker’s objective ¬hG(t) into
an equisatisfiable CNF formula using the
Tseitin transformation (Tseitin (1970)).
4. Consider ψ(si) as the penalty cost of each
variable si and ϕ(n) for atomic nodes.
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Finally, the Weighted Partial MAX-SAT problem is
instantiated as ¬hG(t), which is the objective of
the attacker, and solved by META4ICS (META4ICS
(2019)) as described in (Barre`re et al. (2019)).
4.4. Execution example over Case 2
Let us reconsider Case 2 illustrated in Figure 2. This
scenario can be logically formulated as follows:
fG(c1) = c1 ∧ d ∧ ((a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c))
Based on the protective measures, the AND/OR
hypergraph is logically mapped as follows:
fH(e5) = e5 ∧ e4 ∧ ((e1 ∧ e3) ∨ (e3 ∧ e2))
The new formulation hG(t) produced at step 2 is as
follows:
hG(c1) = (c1 ∨ s5) ∧ (d ∨ s4) ∧
(((a ∨ s1 ∨ s3) ∧ (b ∨ s2)) ∨ ((b ∨ s2) ∧ (c ∨ s1)))
If we now consider, for example, a unit cost on
each atomic node n, i.e. ϕ(n) = 1,∀n ∈ VAT , the
solution of the Weighted Partial MAX-SAT problem
for ¬hG(c1) is composed of instances s1 and s3 with
a total cost of 7. Informally speaking, we are trying
to find a portion of hG(c1) that can be falsified (so
¬hG(c1) is true) with minimal cost. Table 4 shows the
attacker’s costs for each measure instance that are
used as the falsification penalty scores.
Measure instance s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Cost (attacker) 3 7 2 12 inf
Table 4: Falsification penalty scores
We can observe that if the last big clause of hG(c1)
(line 2) is falsified, then hG(c1) is falsified. We can
choose to falsify the whole disjunction by making, for
example, the sub-sentence (b ∨ s2) false. However,
the penalty here is 1 + 7 = 8. If (a ∨ s1 ∨ s3) and
(c ∨ s1) are falsified instead, the cost corresponds to
the penalty paid for the set {a, s1, s3, c} with a total
cost of 1 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 7. The other two options,
(c1 ∨ s5) and (d ∨ s4), have costs infinite and 13
respectively, so the final solution involves the critical
node set {a, c} and measures {s1, s3} with a total
cost of 7.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have performed a thorough experimental
analysis that shows the feasibility and performance
of our approach. In this section, we first describe
the tool and methods used within the experiments.
Afterwards, we explain the obtained results for
independent security measures applied across the
graph. Finally, we study the use of various security
measures applied to multiple nodes simultaneously
and the impact this overlapping poses in terms
of computation time. The experimental evaluation
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Figure 4: Scalability evaluation while increasing graph size
has been performed using a MacBook Pro (15-
inch, 2018), 2.9 GHz Intel Core i9, 32 GB 2400
MHz DDR4.
5.1. Implementation prototype and AND/OR
graph generation
Our implementation prototype relies on META4ICS
(Barre`re et al. (2019)), a Java-based security metric
analyser for ICS, available at (META4ICS (2019)).
META4ICS consumes JSON specification files that
describe ICS environments in the form of AND/OR
graphs, and outputs their security score as well as
the critical nodes that require utmost attention. In this
work, we have extended META4ICS in order to cover
hypergraph-related concepts and the application of
multiple overlapping security measures over ICS
network components.
Within our experiments, we use synthetic pseudo-
random AND/OR graphs of different size and
composition that are generated as described in
(Barre`re et al. (2019)). To create an AND/OR graph
of size n, we first create the target node. Afterwards,
we create a predecessor which has one of the three
types (atomic, AND, OR) according to a probability
given by a compositional configuration predefined
for the experiment. For example, a configuration of
(60, 20, 20) means 60% of atomic nodes, 20% of
AND nodes and 20% of OR nodes. We repeat this
process creating children on the respective nodes
until we approximate the desired size of the graph n.
5.2. Independent security measures
Our first set of experiments studies the impact on
scalability and performance when we increase the
number of security measures applied independently
on each network node. Figure 4 shows the results
of this evaluation over AND/OR graphs with up to
10000 nodes.
We have measured the MAX-SAT resolution time
for graphs of different sizes in four sub-experiments
that use a different number of independent security
controls (1, 5, 7 and 10) on each graph node. Each
sub-experiment has been repeated 10 times and
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Figure 5: Performance while increasing nodes’ measures
we have taken the average results. As expected,
we can observe that the more security measures
we use to protect each node independently, the
more time is required to compute the underlying
security metric. As explained in (Barre`re et al.
(2019)), even when there are small time variations
on each sub-experiment due to the compositional
characteristics of some random AND/OR graphs, the
overall behaviour remains relatively stable.
Figure 5 shows a closer look at the logical
transformation and MAX-SAT resolution times for
graphs with 1000 nodes while increasing the
use of independent security measures. We can
observe that the MAX-SAT resolution time grows
polynomially. This is essentially explained by the fact
that each node variable n is replaced by a larger
disjunction with x logical variables (for x security
measures) plus the node variable itself. Because
each node is protected by a different set of security
measures (no overlapping), such replacement just
increments the size of the formula by a factor of
x. Therefore, the overall process is still solved in
polynomial time. In hypergraph terms, the smaller
the hyperedges, the lower the computation time.
The previous experiments are focused on security
measures that are applied individually on each ICS
component. As mentioned before, however, many
security measures may be used to protect two or
more components altogether in practice, e.g. fenced
areas. In the next section, we evaluate our approach
considering multiple overlapping security measures.
5.3. Overlapping security measures
In order to analyse scenarios where two or more
nodes may be protected by the same security
control, we use a simple probabilistic method to
generate a protection assignment as follows. Let x
be the number of security measures to be applied
on each graph node n ∈ VAT . We then traverse the
set VAT , and for each node, we stochastically choose
whether to assign the same security measure used
with the last node, or conversely, to use a new one.
In mathematical terms, we apply the same security
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Figure 6: Variation analysis of overlapping measures
control with probability p (positive overlapping), or
we apply a new one with probability 1 − p (no
overlapping). We repeat the above procedure x
times. Figure 6 shows the behaviour of the MAX-
SAT resolution time over graphs with 1000 nodes
that have been protected following the previous
assignment.
We can observe that, as the probability of
overlapping increases from 0 to 1, the MAX-SAT
resolution time decreases. In other words, the
greater the level of overlapping, the easier is for
the MAX-SAT solver engine to find the solution. In
addition, this behaviour is observed independently
of the number of security measures applied in the
experiment. In logical terms, this happens because
a security measure that protects many nodes will
appear on the logical expansion of all of them (step 2,
Section 4.3), and therefore, the MAX-SAT solver
leverages such interdependency to speed up the
overall resolution process. We have performed a
similar analysis on larger AND/OR graphs and the
results indicate the same behavioural pattern, as
shown in Figure 7.
The experiments involve AND/OR graphs with 1000
to 10000 nodes, using 5 security measures on each
node. As expected, the results suggest that the
more nodes are protected by the same security
measures (i.e. higher probability), the faster is the
resolution process. In the next section, we validate
our approach through a comprehensive case study.
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Figure 8: Basic WTN component (Nicolaou et al. (2018))
6. CASE STUDY
Our case study is focused on water transport
networks (WTNs) where we examine the applicability
of our approach over real WTNs typically deployed in
European countries.
6.1. Case study description
Typical WTNs are composed of the following
main physical elements: (i) tanks, (ii) pumping
stations, (iii) water sources (e.g., boreholes), and
(iv) pipes. To monitor the status of each element,
utilities deploy electronic sensing devices and collect
measurements regarding the flow, pressure, level,
and quality of the water that flows in the system. A
typical configuration found in several water utilities
(see Trifunovic (2006)) is similar to the one shown in
Figure 8. The same structure appears repeatedly in
larger infrastructures. In this work, we focus on the
subsystem shown in Figure 8.
In this setup, drinking water is extracted from a water
source (e.g., a borehole or another tank) using a
pump. The pump increases the water pressure which
pushes the water into a tank, which may be located a
few kilometres away at a higher elevation. The water
tank is then used to provide water to consumers,
as well as to transfer water to other subsystems, for
instance, through another pump-tank subsystem.
The subsystem shown in Figure 8 involves the
following sensing elements: a pressure sensor
before the pump (s1), a pressure sensor after the
pump (s2), and a water flow sensor (s3) measuring
the pump outflow. At the water tank, flow sensors
(s4, s6) may also be installed for monitoring the inflow
and outflow respectively. For its operation, the control
system is comprised of two Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs); one situated at the pump and the
other at the water tank. These PLCs are connected
to the system’s sensors and actuators, and execute
programs to achieve the control objectives. More
specifically, the sensing node s5 provides the water
level state measurement s5(k) to the agent a1 in
PLC-T1, where k is the discrete time step. Then,
the control logic is executed, and the result v(k) is
transmitted to PLC-P1, where another control logic
a2 is executed. Agent a2 instructs the contactor (i.e.,
an electrically operated relay) through a signal c1(k)
to turn on/off the pump, should the pump flow s3 be
below a threshold.
6.2. Data collection and preparation
Various security measures are applied by water
utilities in order to protect the components of their
systems against malicious actors. We have acquired
data from a number of water utilities and public
information sources in order to: (i) determine typical
measures used to protect their infrastructures, and
(ii) identify components that are protected by multiple
overlapping measures.
Table 6 presents a sample list of the measures
acquired. We evaluate three different factors in order
to calculate the cost of the attacker to compromise
a security measure: (i) skills/knowledge required to
design and execute the attack (f1), (ii) tools needed
for the attack (f2), and (iii) time needed to execute
the attack(f3). We use a three-point scale to rate the
three factors for each measure, as shown in Table 5.
Factor / Rate 1 2 3
Skills (f1) no special skills
/ knowledge
advanced skills /
knowledge
expert skills /
knowledge
Tools (f2) off-the-shelf
tools
non-conventional
tools required
specialized
tools
Time (f3) ≤ 10 min 10-30 min ≥ 30 min
Table 5: Attacker’s cost - Three-point rating scale
Then, for each collected measure m, we calculate
the attacker cost ψ(m) as the product of each
individual rating: ψ(m) = f1× f2× f3.
The cost of each component determines the level of
difficulty an attacker will have to compromise it. The
security measures along with their individual ratings
and attack costs are depicted in Table 6.
Measure Skills Tools Time Attack
cost
Description
F1 1 1 1 1 Fenced area (wire)
F2 1 2 1 2 Fenced area (locked
underground facility)
B1 1 1 2 2 Building + regular lock
B2 2 2 2 8 Building + secure lock
A1 2 3 2 12 Door alarm
A2 3 2 3 18 Alarm on telemetry box
A3 1 1 3 3 Patrol unit
P1 1 2 1 2 Locked box
P2 2 2 2 8 Cable protection
Table 6: Typical security measures and attack costs
Based on this information, we have used our
methodology to determine the security level of such
infrastructures.
6.3. Base WTN subsystem (no redundancy)
According to the collected data, the base WTN
subsystem shown in Figure 8 involves multiple
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security measures that simultaneously protect
various components as shown in Table 7. For
example, agent a1 is protected by a wired fence
(F1-2), located inside a building with a security lock
(B1-1), and an alarm system (A3-1). Sensor s5 is
also protected by the same measure instances but
also by a protection box (P2-2). In order to make
the scenario even more interesting, we assume the
special case where c1 has been heavily protected
and cannot be compromised (infinite cost).
Components Security measures Total cost
s3 {F2-1, P1-2, A2-2} 22
s5 {F1-2, B1-1, A3-1, P2-2} 14
a1 {F1-2, B1-1, A3-1} 6
a2 {F1-1, B2-1, P1-1, A2-1} 29
c1 {F1-1, B2-1} 9 + inf (special case)
Table 7: Measures per component (base subsystem)
The total cost to compromise a component n
is computed as
∑
m∈Sn ψ(m), where Sn is the
set of security measures protecting n. Given the
AND/OR specification of the base subsystem with
no redundancy, we have run META4ICS in order
to identify the set of critical ICS components and
security measures, as shown in Figure 9.
(a) AND/OR graph (b) AND/OR hypergraph
Figure 9: Base scenario
Figure 9a shows the AND/OR graph of the network
where, given the applied measures, META4ICS
has identified agent a1 at PLC-T1 as the weakest
point that can disable actuator c1. Its compromise
implies to bypass three security measures (F1-2,
B1-1, A3-1) with a total cost of 6. Figure 9b shows
the AND/OR hypergraph of the system involving
its multiple overlapping measures. Agent a1 is
responsible for measuring the water level of the
tank and deciding whether to send a signal to turn
on/off the pump. Note that sensor s5, which also
measures the level of the tank, was not identified as
a critical node as it is guarded with stronger security
measures and a total attack cost of 14 (see Table 7).
6.4. Extended WTN subsystem with redundancy
WTN systems are typically set up using the
minimum configuration. However, additional sensors
and agents can be used to introduce analytical
redundancy in order to ensure the reliable operation
of the system. In that context, we have analysed
an extended scenario, detailed in (Nicolaou et
al. (2018)), involving the components and security
Components Security measures Total cost
a2, a7, a8, a10 {F1-1, B2-1, P1-1, A2-1} 29
a1, a3, a9 {F1-2, B1-1, A3-1} 6
s1, s2 {F1-1, B2-1} 9
c1 {F1-1, B2-1} 9 + inf (special case)
s3 {F2-1, P1-2, A2-2} 22
s4 {F1-2, B1-1, A3-1, P2-1} 14
s5 {F1-2, B1-1, A3-1, P2-2} 14
s6 {F2-2, P1-3, A2-3, A3-1} 25
Table 8: Measures per component (redundant subsystem)
measures listed in Table 8. Table 9 on the other hand
shows the components protected by each measure
instance and their costs.
Measure
instance
Measure
type
Attacker
cost
Protection range
F1-1 F1 1 {a2, a7, a8, a10, c1, s1, s2}
F1-2 F1 1 {a1, a3, a9, s4, s5}
F2-1 F2 2 {s3}
F2-2 F2 2 {s6}
B1-1 B1 2 {a1, a3, a9, s4, s5}
B2-1 B2 8 {a2, a7, a8, a10, c1, s1, s2}
A2-1 A2 18 {a2, a7, a8, a10}
A2-2 A2 18 {s3}
A2-3 A2 18 {s6}
A3-1 A3 3 {a1, a3, a9, s4, s5, s6}
P1-1 P1 2 {a2, a7, a8, a10}
P1-2 P1 2 {s3}
P1-3 P1 2 {s6}
P2-1 P2 8 {s4}
P2-2 P2 8 {s5}
Table 9: Components per measure instance
The structure of the network as well as the
critical nodes identified by META4ICS are shown in
Figure 10. The optimal strategy indicated by the tool
involves agent a1 and sensor s2 as the critical nodes
and five different measure instances (F1-2, B1-1,
A3-1, F1-1, B2-1) that should be violated so as to
disable actuator c1, with a total attack cost of 15. Note
that the security level of this configuration is much
higher than the settings without redundancy.
Figure 10: AND/OR hypergraph with overlapping measures
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It is important to note that, as opposed to the base
scenario, identifying critical components and security
measures on larger scenarios with various compo-
nents and multiple overlapping security measures
becomes significantly harder. In that context, our ap-
proach provides strong support for security decision-
making, prioritising mitigation plans, and increasing
the resilience of ICS environments.
7. RELATED WORK
Since the early 2000s, many research efforts have
been produced to understand and improve the se-
curity of industrial control systems and critical na-
tional infrastructure (Desmedt and Wang (2004)).
These works have inspired the need for taking into
account the cyber-physical dependencies between
ICS components and being able to combine them
in order to provide quantifiable measurements (Hu-
mayed et al. (2017)). As such, our approach builds
upon the contributions presented in (Nicolaou et al.
(2018), Barre`re et al. (2019)). The latter provides a
complete AND/OR graph-based modelling capable
of grasping complex interdependencies among CPS
components. However, the approach only covers
security controls that are applied independently to
each ICS component, thus involving a single score
for each one of them. In this paper, we extend
such an approach by allowing ICS components to
share multiple overlapping cyber-physical security
measures and providing an overall security score for
the ICS network.
From a graph-theoretical perspective, the underlying
base security metric used in this paper, presented
in (Barre`re et al. (2019)), looks for a minimal
weighted vertex cut in AND/OR graphs. This is an
NP-complete problem as shown in (Desmedt and
Wang (2004); Jakimoski and Burmester (2004);
Souza et al. (2013)). While well-known algorithms
such as Max-flow Min-cut (Ford and Fulkerson
(1962)) and variants of it could be used to estimate
such metric over OR graphs in polynomial time, their
use for general AND/OR graphs is not evident nor
trivial as they may fail to capture the underlying
logical semantics of the graph. In that context, we
leverage state-of-the-art techniques which excel in
the domain of logical satisfiability and boolean
optimisation problems (Davies and Bacchus (2011)).
A close research area to our problem includes
the domain of attack graphs (Wang et al. (2017),
Barre`re et al. (2017), Shandilya et al. (2014)). While
attack graphs are mainly focused on depicting the
many ways in which an attacker may compromise
assets in a computer network, our approach is
essentially different as we consider that network
nodes can be equally compromised. In addition,
attack graphs usually take into account only cyber
lateral movements, without considering operational
cyber-physical dependencies among components
(Humayed et al. (2017)). Moreover, real ICS models
based on AND/OR graphs might also be cyclic,
thus presenting the interdiction problem (Altner et
al. (2010)). We deal with cycles using a similar
approach to that considered in (Wang et al. (2017)).
Other attempts to identify critical cyber-physical
components have been made in the domain of
network centrality measurements (Deng et al.
(2018)). While useful in many types of scenarios
(Steiner et al. (2018)), almost all of them are focused
on OR-only graph-based models for IT networks.
In addition, we realise that automating ICS asset
mapping is not an easy task for different reasons,
among these, because active probing and scanning
may be too intrusive, which might raise concerns
about operational disruptions. However, this is a
premise that many security platforms already take
into account, e.g., in the form of passive monitoring
(CyberXReport (2019)).
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Industrial control systems typically involve a large
spectrum of overlapping cyber-physical security
measures used to protect their operational compo-
nents. As such, understanding which security mea-
sures and ICS components should be compromised
so as to disturb the normal operation of the system
with minimal cost for an attacker is a challenging
task. In this paper, we solve this problem via an ef-
ficient mechanism based on AND/OR hypergraphs,
which is able to capture complex interdependencies
among ICS components and the measures used
to protect them. Our approach extends the MAX-
SAT-based techniques presented in (Barre`re et al.
(2019)) and is able to scale to thousands of nodes in
seconds, as demonstrated in our experimental eval-
uation. In addition, we have presented a thorough
case study conducted over a realistic water transport
network that shows the applicability of our method.
As future work, we plan to further analyse our
approach on other classes of ICS systems such
as smart grids and power plants. We also plan to
extend our methodology to integrate attack graphs at
the cyber level, socio-technical aspects, multi-target
attacks, and defence budget constraints. Redundant
components sometimes handle only a fraction of
the functions provided by main components. We
plan to refine our model to cover this aspect as
well as standard fault-tolerant techniques such as
triple modular redundancy (TMR) (Kastensmidt et
al. (2005)). Finally, we aim at further investigating
automated mechanisms to generate AND/OR graph-
based models for ICS environments.
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